Does the Chair
John Read
Structuralism found its impetus with the societal
metamorphosis of the fin de siècle generation, which found itself, on the eve of World War I suddenly
questioning the very structures of all formal institutions. To many, it seemed that the Western world had
come under the scrutiny of a paradoxical, scientific and neo-romantic structure
that could be detected throughout all analytical disciplines. This idea of structure would permeate several
fields, including biology, language, literature, and eventually filter down to
the interpretations of history. By the post-war
era, structuralism had become an identifiable set of theories, focused on the
study of the inherent structures within our cultural products utilizing
analytical concepts which include the text of linguistics, psychology, history
and so on.
Within these structures is where we find our
chair. Its physical structure could
consist of a myriad of styles, shapes or materials. From its atomic structure
to its atomized finish, it provides a function of interconnected parts which
are recognized as a system of structures. Thus, a chair is physically recognized
cross-culturally as a system function that has a structure. Its purpose is to comfortably fit a multitude
of derrieres that reside in the here and now, without any perceived
metaphysical or aesthetic attributes.
Classifications, however, are of human
construct. The notion of the “chair” was
designed solely to convey a set of accessible cognitive signs that easily
communicates simple information. This,
too, is a structure of linguistics, syntax and semantics that represents a
timeless construct of spatiotemporally.[1]
As the very first humans had discovered, one could
sit on rocks or logs; chairs would come later. Nevertheless, the very first
idea of sitting on an object and the very first guttural utterances preserved
the symbolic structure of our chair. So, it is through the metaphorical
relationship of sign that our chair takes life.
No longer do we have to look at it as a cold material object, whose
atomic molecules move imperceptibly too slow for existence categorization. Our chair lives in the here and now,
therefore we can submit it lived in the “before now.” The “ideality and living
presence in all its forms is living speech, the spirituality of the breath as phŏnĕ; and on the other hand,
that phenomenology, the metaphysics of presence in the form of ideality, is
also a philosophy of life.”[2] It is our universal linguistic “difference
that preserves language.”[3]
Yet, it is when we explore our chair within the
boundaries of the phenomena of communication that meaning can become hidden or
subjective. Our internal construct of our sign comes in conflict with the
“intimate possibility of a relation to a beyond and to an outside.”[4] In understanding our chair, we must
understand the “essence of the intentional consciousness [that] will only be
revealed in the reduction of the totality of the existing world in general.”[5] Accordingly, the sentence “Does the chair
really have a secret?” has no real linguistic meaning. It is only when we break down this sentence
into individual words that we have real or ideal content. I know what a chair is, so therefore, I can
relate my here and now meaning to a timeless understanding. Conversely, taken holistically in the view of
syntax of structure, our sentence on the surface, fails to express a
functionality of meaning.
It is here at this point, that I believe Jacques Derrida, the eminent French deconstructionalist, is wrong in refuting Husserl’s concept of sign. Derrida pronounces that, “we must already
have a precomprehension of the essence, the function or essential structure of
the sign in general.” Derrida continues:
“Beyond the opposition of ‘idealism,’ and ‘realism,’ ‘subjectivism,’ and
‘objectivism,’ etc., transcendentalism phenomenological idealism answers to the
necessity of describing the objectivity of the object.”[6] Therefore, I submit as an example, if during
my historical research of second century
Structuralists continued to wrestle with
these questions about the transitive property of signs and argued over the many
possible answers. By mid-century, Structuralism faced What's New external challenges
of interpreting structures. The field split, producing two other sets of
theories: post-structuralism and post-modernism, each developing their own
interpretation of origins and functionality.
The American historian, Gertrude
Himmelfarb, has defined post-modernism as “a denial of the fixity of language,
of any correspondence between language and reality, indeed of any ‘essential’
reality and thus of any proximate truth about reality.” She continues by
stating, “In history, it is a denial of the fixity of the past, of the reality
of the past apart from what the historian chooses to make of it, and thus of any
objective truth of about the past.” “Post-modernist history, one might say,
recognizes no reality principle, only the pleasure principle.”[9] Post-modernism is an idea
that implies a very slippery slope concept in which our modern concept of the
here and now is only a relative perspective, and reality is the subjective
construct of providing an anarchic demographic and psychographic reduction into
absurdity. According to Himmelfarb’s definition, our chair no longer has a
secret, for it no longer exists as a chair.
Text of its relevance is a denial of its objective truth.[10]
The British
historian, Sir Geoffrey Elton starts the return of our circular journey of
conservative, historical chair analysis. Elton states: “People have usually
sought in history a justification for their convictions and prejudices; whole
nations have over the centuries lived in cocoons of convenient myths the
demolition of which they very much resent.” “…but supposed truths proved in
historical writings which are in fact probably untrue but have gained their
hold by being comforting to some ascendant political or ethnic structure or to
some emotional need.”[11] Our poor chair finally has a champion. No longer will it suffer the post-modernist
categorization or, to be denied.
Our chair exists, for “[i]t is only by providing as truthful an
understanding of the past as we can obtain that we can offer to the present a
past which can be useful to the present, a past from which it can learn.”[12]
We next turn
to Dominick LaCapra, Professor of History and Human Studies, to help us explain
our question, “does the chair really have
a secret?” LaCapra would be searching
for the textual-contextual nature of the internal dialogue in which our chair
originally existed. It seems likely that
he would suggest that the textual nature of our chair sentence is ironic. He forces us to read and think about our
chair as intellectual history, by looking at the structural ways historians
themselves are involved in making sense of text and questioning the historians’
right of contextual omniscience in the narrative.
Our chair’s
journey will end with the post-modernist views of Hayden White’s contextual
discipline of emplotment. We will start
with satire that sees only
meaningless change in human life. In the case of our chair, it has changed
little since its inception. Being a
chair, its view of human affairs would display no pattern and if it did, it
would for the most part, see that they are governed by folly and chance. Our chair’s mode of argument would be organicist.
For it assumes that individual units are determined by their
place in a larger whole and by a common spirit. Our chair’s mode of ideology would be strictly
conservative. Being a chair it could not
possibly have any other logical preconceptions, other then that everything must
turn out okay in the end.[13]
So in the end, the chair does have a secret, but
chairs being chairs and therefore inanimate objects, will not tell their
secret. Yet nevertheless, we can only guess that their secret would rest on the
metaphoric social representation and interaction with humanity.
[1] Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena And Other Essays on
Husserl’s Theory of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973),
xv. .
[2] Derrida, 11.
[3] Derrida, 14.
[4] Derrida,
22.
[5] Derrida, 22.
[6] Derrida,
22-23.
[7] http://www.What's Newyorkcarver.com/inventions2.htm Visited on 15 Dec. 06
[8] From Romeo and
Juliet (II, ii, 1-2)
[9] Keith Jenkins, The
Postmodern History Reader. Telling it as you like it: postmodernist history and
the flight from fact (London:
Routledge,1997), 158
[10] Jenkins, 164
[11] Jenkins, 174
[12] Jenkins,
178
[13] http://users.ox.ac.uk/~spet0201/lectures/histlink/whiteho.html Visited on 15 Dec. 06